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The paper that follows intends to explore the interface between the imaginary and technique in relation 
to the question of human nature. The route that will be taken in this exploratory journey will be traced 
via the conceptual maps of morphology that began to appear with Goethe’s studies of nature. Following 
this cartographic tradition, I claim that human nature is a particular energetic field activated thanks to 
the relationship of two polarities: one is the imaginary and the other is the technique. Into this energetic 
field the life of the social-historical forms – in which each human community takes a specific place in the 
world; to be born, to live and to die cyclically. Therefore, this is the final destination of the journey that 
is offered to the reader here. 
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Introduct ion  
 
 
The unhistorical resembles an enveloping 
atmosphere in which alone life is generated only 
to disappear again with the destruction of this 
atmosphere. It is true: only so far as man, by 
thinking, reflecting, comparing, dividing and joining, 
limits that unhistorical element; only so far as a 
bright lightning flash of light occurs within that 
encircling cloud of mist—that is, only through the 
power to use the past for life and to refashion 
what has happened into history, does man 
become man: but with an excess of history man 
ceases again, and without that cloak of the 
unhistorical he would never have begun and dared 
to begin. (Nietzsche, 1980: 11) 
 
The following paper intends to explore the interweaving between the imaginative and 
the technical dimension by linking it to human nature. The route that guides this voyage of 
discovery will be traced via the conceptual maps of morphology, which appeared after 
Goethe’s studies on Nature. He was the first cartographer of life forms who tried to lead 
science to think with nature rather than about nature. This approach was not totally 
unheeded by the paradigms within the rising natural sciences. There were some German 
thinkers of Kultur who between the end of the19th century and the 20th century took up 
the Goethian way to understand, in vital terms, historical social processes. It is not by 
chance that Nietzsche, one of the first followers of this movement, recalls the poet-
scientist in the opening of his essay On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for 
Life (Nietzsche, 1980: 7). Nietzsche stresses that human time is not all inscribed in history; 
there is an unhistorical dimension as well. This dimension does not refer to a metaphysical 
level, like the one which bypasses the spirit in Hegelian history. The Nietzschean 
unhistorical dimension is an elementary place, a natural landscape – as can be noted in the 
passage cited above – so full of energy able to generate and destroy the historical world 
cyclically. In this breakdown of human temporality you can see how Nietzsche finds in 
Goethe that elective figure with whom to interact in order to identify the historical-
landscape that binds human temporality to the dynamics of life. The imaginative and 
technical spheres will be defined as the polarity of activation of this unhistorical energy 
field; and from this the unrepeatable historical-social forms in which human communities 
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have always lived in the world find both their centre of configuration and the origins of 
those erosive currents that, dissolve in a cycle. This is the theory that I will try to develop 
on the journey that I am suggesting to the reader.     
 
 
1 .  The energet ic nature of Nature: physis and/as gestaltung  
 
To begin to enter the unhistorical world, it is necessary to fulfil the transvaluation of values 
– to use another Nietzschean expression – that is the matrix within our traditional way of 
thinking towards the construction of the concept of nature, especially that of human 
nature.  
It is unavoidable, when dealing with that concept, not to refer to the famous debate 
between Chomsky and Foucault aired in November 1971 on Dutch television1. Thanks to 
the ability of Fons Elders, the moderator of the debate, the meeting was able to transform 
the television studio in an epic joust between two knights of the critical thinking of the 
era. What was at stake was the very notion of human nature. After almost 50 years, the 
scientific debate has only served to prolong and radicalize the rift that opened during the 
Foucault / Chomsky dispute and this without there being a TV studio to duel in.  
The mandatory step on our journey towards an account of human nature must be found 
in this studio. Try and imagine for a moment sitting in the Dutch audience listening again 
to the words of that day in November. Foucault, from the prestigious ‘castle’ of Collège 
de France, from the start immediately shows his impatience at the term nature and even 
more to that of human nature. As evidenced by his acute reasoning, human nature is 
nothing natural; it is on the contrary that epistemologically revelatory indication of the 
new scientific discourse which appeared at the end of the 18th century2. Until then, 
Foucault continues, living beings were part of a broader framework that ranged from 
minerals to man. Biology and medicine distinguished the part of these beings included in 
this generic framework through the concept of life through which more a quality was 
designated to these beings; it carried out the task of outlining the boundaries of their 
rising discursive order. Even the concept of human nature for Foucault performs a similar 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfNl2L0Gf8 
2 “It seems to me more likely that the transformations of biological knowledge at the end of the eighteenth 
century were demonstrated on one hand by a whole series of new concepts for use in scientific discourse 
and on the other hand gave rise to a notion like that of life which has enabled us to designate, to delimit, 
and to situate a certain type of scientific discourse, among other things. I would say that the notion of life is 
not a scientific concept; it has been an epistemological indicator of which the classifying, delimiting, and 
other functions had an effect on scientific discussions, and not on what they were talking about. 
Well, it seems to me that the notion of human nature is of the same type.” (Foucault, 1974: 17) 
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function by whoever unknowingly uses it – and it is what he gently scolds his contender 
for in the woven linguistic structure of the knowledge power nexus (Foucault, 1974: 43).  
On the other side of the table, Chomsky, from the equally prestigious castle of the 
Institute of Technology in Massachusetts, responds blow for blow to the cutting remarks 
from his adversary. While agreeing with some of Foucault’s points, the question for him is 
not all due to a language game produced by scientific structures. Apart from this, for the 
American linguist, there is a certain biological organisation that characterized the human 
cognitive structure that remained unchanged from Homo du Cro-Magnon3 onwards. This 
is what drives him to track down man’s originating core, which is organically based and has 
a set of values such as justice, creativity and non violence (Chomsky, 1974: 42-43). 
Chomsky thinks the evolution of science, despite its jagged path, is responsible - and has 
to recognise these founding human values through which it is possible to free man from 
those residues of history which repress him in dominant social systems such as those 
produced by the State, by the multinationals or the police (Chomsky, 1974: 39). These 
are the values Chomsky specifies that legitimize disobedience, at times violent, if oriented 
at a higher level of justice which is closer to humanity.  
Therefore, human nature is a cultural artefact produced by scientific discourses as 
Foucault argues, or is it the inner organic nucleus in man’s cognitive structure indicated by 
Chomsky?  
Rather than determine whose side I am on, I believe the historic moment has come to 
highlight their unintentional point of contact. Both of them brought back the idea of 
nature either to something, or a substance; a linguistic object for Foucault or something 
organic for Chomsky. These are the two conceptual points of view that still generate 
today that insidious narrow concept that just as the mythological monsters Scylla and 
Charyibdis that separate Sicily from Europe, seem to swallow the reflections of those who 
choose to enter. To navigate these discursive eddies, which are only the resurfacing of the 
archetypal dichotomy of nature-culture, I will refer to as physis; to that term with which 
the pre-Socratic world declined the term nature (Heidegger, 2000). It is possible to read 
in a fragment by Heraclitus:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 “Well, I think that as a matter of biological and anthropological fact, the nature of human intelligence 
certainly has not changed in any substantial way, at least since the seventeenth century, or probably since 
Cro-Magnon man. That is, I think that the fundamental properties of our intelligence, those that are within 
the domain of what we are discussing tonight, are certainly very ancient; and that if you took a man from 
five thousand or maybe twenty thousand years ago and placed him as a child within today’s society, he 
would learn what everyone else learns, and he would be a genius or a fool or something else, but he 
wouldn’t be fundamentally different.” (Chomsky, 1974: 36) 
!
!
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That which always was, and is, and will be everliving fire, the same for all, the cosmos, made 
neither by god nor man, replenishes in measure as it burns away. (Heraclitus, 2001: 44). 
 
The view of nature as outlined in the fragment does not find its reference in something; 
physis, on the contrary, is a generative elemental power of the entire cosmos: that of fire. 
These are the measurements by which it replenishes and burns in a way that makes the 
world appear and disappear. A processual creative cycle that in itself is the origin and the 
end - surpassing both the demiurgic will of gods and the hybris of man. In fact they are 
not the centre of emission of this revelatory power of the cosmos, but only passive 
spectators who can impose nothing on its flickering. It seems evident that such a vision of 
nature is what makes every objectification misleading; to do this would be to leave the 
eternal rhythmic movement that makes each life form instrumental in its fiery dynamic..  
Only a few decades later, with the beginning of philosophy, will the Heraclitean physis 
cease to be a flow, to become the field of changing and deceptive phenomena to be 
redefined within the immutable categories of logos. A vision that, within our tradition of 
thought, begins to separate the world; the physical, which is the centre of the mutability of 
natural phenomena, from the metaphysical, centre of immutable truth. In this division, 
philosophical thought wanders in the metaphysical world in order to explain the physical 
one and not vice versa (Heidegger, 1997).  
The historico-cultural crossroads created in medieval times between philosophy ad 
theology will cause a second degree of separation between the physical and the 
metaphysical world. In this case it will be God that takes the place of the logos becoming, 
as we read in the book of Genesis, the creator of everything in the world: day and night, 
the earth and seas, the plants, the animals and also man, who is a copy created in his own 
image and likeness. Also in this case nature becomes a product, a natura naturata through 
the work of natura naturante, of God (Merleau-Ponty, 1995: 26-27).  
Modernity radicalized this disjunctive thought, producing the secularization process that 
will make of nature a mere res-extensa, as Descartes calls it (Descartes, 1998). After the 
logos and God, it is only the res-cogitans of the modern individual that gives reasons in 
geometric terms of nature reduced to a purely material extension devoid of every 
magical-religious value. 
Foucault and Chomsky, in this context, have merely continued to foreground this 
genealogy of separation and reification of nature. Even for them, nature is not a flow of 
energy, but rather a hypostatized world; an inert object for fervent discussion without 
having its own word - an alien dimension from elsewhere, from the world of ideas, from 
God’s creation, from the intellect which doubts, or from the structure of science.  In the 
modern era it has been the unfashionable science of Goethe which has become the 
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emerging source of of a conception of physis as energy flow concealed from our tradition 
of thought. As with Heraclitus, even for Goethe nature is neither immutable, nor closed, 
nor fixed but an idea at work, as he categorically states in the following passage:  
 
The Germans have a word for the complex of existence presented by a physical organism: 
Gestalt [structured form]. With this expression they exclude what is changeable and 
assume that an interrelated whole is identified, defined, and fixed in character. But if we 
look at all these Gestalten, especially the organic ones, we will discover that nothing in 
them is permanent, nothing is at rest or defined —everything is in a flux of continual 
motion. This is why German frequently and fittingly makes use of the word Bildung 
[formation] to describe the end product and what is in process of production as well. Thus 
in setting forth a morphology we should not speak of Gestalt, or if we use the term we 
should at least do so only in reference to the idea, the concept, or to an empirical element 
held fast for a mere moment of time. When something has acquired a form it 
metamorphoses immediately to a new one. If we wish to arrive at some living perception 
of nature we ourselves must remain as quick and flexible as nature and follow the example 
she gives. (Goethe, 1988: 63-64) 
 
As well as the Heraclitean cosmic flare, even the continuous oscillation of the whole of 
the natural realm finds its measure in the form of crystals, in physical phenomena, in 
plants, in insects, in the higher animals up to man. Each form, is according to Goethe, the 
particular expression through which to grasp empirically the entelechy of nature; that 
harmony in which each part participates in the whole movement. Therefore, for 
morphology, nature is not defined as a place that serves as a container for the various 
partitions of organic matter contained within it; it is a continuous creative flow that is in 
each form, both in discontinuity and continuity. For Goethe, this discontinuity and 
continuity is to be found in the static quality of the form (Gestalt), in that micro-cosmos 
that differentiates, for example, a plant from an insect; whereas the continuity is to be 
located in the formative process (Bildung), in the movement expressed by the micro-
cosmos which allows both the plant and insect to metamorphose. Analogy is the 
Goethean method through which to read this discontinuity continuity since: 
  
Everything that exists is an analogue of all existing things; that is why existence always and at 
the same time looks to us both separate and interlocked. (Goethe, 1998: 1665) 
  
Unlike the similarity which relates two distinct elements by searching for their mutual 
similarities, analogy finds such similarities in a third element, which is present to a certain 
extent in both. This third element for morphology does not exist in itself, but is immanent 
in variable proportions between the form and the movement through which nature 
operates across the spectrum of the phenomenal world - from the inorganic to the 
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organic. For Goethe, this is the cognitive solution for avoiding that decomposed and-static 
vision of nature produced by the classification of Linneaus, his great enemy along with 
Newton. In 19th century the Goethean route to universal science after Nietzsche was 
followed by the morphologists of social life as Simmel, Spengler and Jünger (Marzo, 2007). 
Each of them identifies in social form and historical dynamics those analogical proportions 
of nature that characterize the human environment.  It will be the focus on environmental 
concepts in the following passage that will allow me to begin to weave the relationship 
between imagination and technique in such a way as to understand both the similarities 
and discontinuities that exist between the animal and human environments. 
  
  
1 I .  Animal environments :  nature in a world of bubbles 
  
Until the publication of the essay A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans 
(Uexküll, 2010) by the biologist and zoologist Jakob von Uexküll, the natural sciences took 
for granted the existence of a life common to all organisms, an idea which prolonged the 
paradigm in biology of the Newtonian universe based on the invariance of space-time. 
This, as is known, was paradigmatic up to the exposure of the theory of restricted 
relativity developed by Einstein in 1905. A few decades afterwards Uexküll’s studies 
produced a similar paradigmatic transition bringing the theory of relativity into the world 
of organic life. Through a passage in unknown invisible worlds, Uexküll shows the reader 
how each species is placed in its own space-time, that defines its Umwelt - its 
environment. In this way Nature becomes made up of specific environments, of 
demarcated bubbles within which the species perceive only a partiality of the world; 
which relates to the characteristics of their organic forms. Take for example the tick 
which, as Uexküll tells us, is the minimal being without eyes that can orient in the world 
with its sense of smell and launches itself from the branch of a tree only when it smells 
the butyric acid of mammals to suck their blood and lay its eggs (Uexküll, 2010: 42). What 
does Uexküll’s tick tell us? 
That not all natural space-time enters its environment, but only that perceived within its 
sense of smell calibrated by the odour of its victim, beyond which natural space ceases to 
exist. Other species, like the tick, are in a relative relationship with the world.  This, 
according to that functional circuit that Uexküll - in a table from his essay (Uexküll, 2010: 
48) – he represents in this way: 
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The scheme is valuable not only because it exemplifies the concept of environment, but 
also because it allows me to begin to disclose the relationship between image and 
technique. If on the left of the circuit we find the organism, that space if made up of 
perceptive and operative organs, then on the right is the object, that aspect of the world 
with which it is in relation. The image is what occupies the upper part of the scheme 
proposed by Uexküll; that level within which each body gives form to the perceptual data 
based on its own sensory kit. In this sense the image is obviously not referable to that 
tricky world of shadows that, from mythical Platonic’s cave, our tradition of thought has 
separated from the real world. The image is, on the contrary, the framework within which 
the complexity of the stimuli from the surrounding area is seduced based on the 
perceptual characteristics of the organism; thanks to this process of representation, the 
organism can enter into sensory contact with the object that arouses its attention with 
that part of the world its environment reveals as a 'whole'. Let us use the subtlety of 
Simmel's thought to requalify the term image; 
  
We are convinced that all representations of what exists are functions of a specific physical 
and psychological organization which do not mirror the outside world in any mechanical 
way. The images of the world of an insect with its mosaic eyes, of an eagle with its almost 
inconceivably keen sight, of an olm with its buried, functionless eyes, of ourselves and of 
innumerable other species, must be profoundly different from each other; and we must 
conclude that none of them reproduces the content of the external world in its inherent 
objectivity. Nevertheless these representations, which have been characterized at least 
negatively, form the presuppositions, the material and the directives for our practical 
activity, through which we establish a relationship with the world as it exists in relative 
independence of our subjectively determined representation. (Simmel, 2004: 333-334) 
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Therefore, the images are not something ephemeral; they are those forms of 
representation, which despite their partiality, provide the species with that material that 
presides over the practical action. It is here that we encounter the other pole of the 
Uexküllian scheme, the operational field that along with the perceptual circuit that makes 
up the animal environments. If the image elaborates the stimuli, the operational scheme is 
the answer with which the organism expresses its forms of representation in action, as 
happens with the tick. It is the elaboration of its olfactory image of the world that 
activates its operational plan by which it tactically drops onto its victim's fur to suck its 
blood. In every animal environment, these are the operational tactics that define the 
essence of the secondary technique as Spengler explains: 
 
If we are to understand the essence of Technics, we must not start from the technics of the 
machine age, and still less from the misleading notion that the fashioning of machines and 
tools is the aim of technics. For, in reality, technics is immemorially old, and moreover it is 
not something historically specific, but something immensely general. It extends far beyond 
mankind, back into the life of the animals, indeed of all animals. […]Technics is the tactics of 
living; it is the inner form of which the procedure of conflict — the conflict that is identical 
with Life itself — is the outward expression. (Spengler, 1976: 9) 
  
Therefore technics is not a human specificity: in as much as it is a tactic of life it is what 
unites all beings, the technics of a form of life is also expressed with degrees of such 
sophistication as to produce both language and artefacts. Around the middle of the 20th 
century, Frish, while observing the world of bees, managed to decipher part of their 
refined language made up not of phonemes but as a choreography expressed by their 
dances (see Frisch, 1971). It is therefore neither the presence of language that indicates 
the difference between man and other species nor indeed the technical construction 
ability. As Lorenz’s ethologcial studies indicate, numerous species - from mammals to 
insects - express adaptive tactics able to modify their own environments through 
ingenious constructions. (Lozenz 2008). One cannot say, for example, that the beaver, 
known to be a skilled architect of dams, or the ant, the planner of real cities with 
underground anthills, well before the advent of humanity, are not expressions of 
elaborated  construction technics. As well as the image, it is also the technique that binds 
analogically all forms of life.     
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I I I .  Man’s techno-imaginat ive environment:  a second socia l  
nature  
  
Having compared analogically the dimension of the image with the technical one it is 
necessary to include those specific proportions that differentiate the human environment 
from the animal one. Of course, man is positioned in his own perceptual and practical 
space-time, but with a particularity which is his variability. It is this quality which opens that 
functional circuit between image and technique that characterizes the human 
environment. Let us begin from the perceptual image, for example an oak, as Uexküll 
(Uexküll, 2010: 152-156) always says; in its uniqueness it can become the subject of 
various image constructions. The rational image of an old forester will allow him to 
perceive it as something from which to derive a woodpile from the movement of his axe. 
The fairytale image of a young girl immersed in her childhood world can perceive it to be 
an evil human face to escape from. Basically, man is capable of giving life to endlessly 
variable images because he also has an imaginative capacity unlike other animals. We can 
try to locate the imaginative dimension by making use of Damasio’s studies on the mind 
(Damasio, 1994). He says it coincides neither with the body, though it is its essential basis 
as a sensory receptor, nor with the brain where its prime organic location can be found. 
The mind, for the Portuguese neurologist, is that neural destination capable of integrating 
body and brain into a third dimension, thanks to which man can escape from the 
immediacy of the here and now by generating a creative type of ‘open-thinking’ with 
multiple possibilities of interaction in the world that he encounters in his environment. 
The brain integration of sensory image with mobile or physical ones is what predisposes 
the neural basis for real mental activity, which in turn processes it in images within a third 
disposition.  As Damasio says:   
I propose that subjectivity emerges during the latter step when the brain is producing not 
just images of an object, not just images of organism responses to the object, but a third 
kind of image, that of an organism in the act of perceiving and responding to an object. I 
believe the subjective perspective arises out of the content of the third kind of image. 
(Damasio, 1994, 242-243) 
Imagination is the activity constantly at work through whatever these images of the third 
kind take form in, by virtue of which we obtain the eccentric consciousness of being 
actors and spectators at the same time when leading our existence. In this way the mind 
becomes not only the producer of perceptual and motion images, as happens in other 
species with brains, but also of the meta-cognitive images placed over the here and now 
by virtue of the fact that it has the possibility to vary creatively its response patterns of the 
world. Imagination lies precisely in the capacity of the human mind to interrupt the 
stimulus-response circuit that binds the other species in the space-time immediacy (see 
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Marzo 2012). Man is that amphibious being able to be both in the present and out of it, 
that chronic state of semi-estrangement defined by Gehlen (Gehlen, 2010: 383) through 
which he can design his existence in terms of action not reaction. 
Therefore if imagination is that dimension in which man enters into a relationship to the 
world in terms of possibility and not of need, it is through its technique that this creative 
potential takes concrete form. The potential creative imagination is possible due to the 
particular morphology of the human body. It does not have a particularly heavy sensorial 
armour, and is genetically without offensive weapons, claws or teeth, and orients 
awkwardly with its instinct; man is an animal without innate qualities, with a body naturally 
devoid a technical characterization capable of specializing it (see Gehlen, 2003). 
To resume the previous example, it is the beaver that is naturally specialized technically, 
apart from its sharp claws and slender body, it is already adapted to the construction of 
dams. The same can be said of the ant that by virtue of powerful jaws can dig the ground 
for the urban structure of its anthill, but cannot build dams. Both of these species 
incorporate into their particular anatomical morphology a technique that gives them a 
perceptual world and an operational one, in such a way to place them in their 
environmental bubble. The anatomically perfect shapes of the beaver and the ant, link 
them at the same time to a specific operational chain enabling them to always build with 
small variations just dams and anthills.  
Instead, in man his organic form is undefined and his operational schemes are, 
consequently, undefined. To interact with the world as other animals do, man must 
stabilize simultaneously his body through artifices both in material forms (clothing, tools, 
objects, weapons, architectures) and intangible ones (languages, expressive forms, beliefs) 
which are capable of closing technically the natural deficiency of his body. 
The classic natural/artificial dichotomy shows its limitation here, in fact any human artefact 
can be considered as a “missing piece of the body” that our specie produces externally to 
complete its organic nature; for that reason, we can consider  these artefacts as a sort of 
objectification forms of operational schemes through which our species rebalances and 
strengthens its organism. for that reason, we can consider these artefacts as a sort of 
objectification forms of operational schemes through which our species on the one hand 
rebalances its organism and on the other its strength. With the lever, probably one of the 
first rudimentary tools, man began to experience the possibility of being able to move a 
volume of weight superior to his own natural muscle strength, and in this way he was able 
to build (artefacts) something he was not able to do previously. Yet, since then if he 
wants to do what he previously could not – build particularly strong defensive walls, 
organise a state, grind grain, irrigate the fields, divide the atom, drill into the skull to let out 
demons, write with cuneiform characters and so on – he will be forced to appeal world 
of artefacts. You could say that the animal is tied to its environment by its bodily 
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restrictions the same way as man is tied to his technical environment in order to stabilize 
his body. Within this supportive environment man is not only the creator but also the 
creature as every technical gimmick – language, fire, writing, the law code, printing, 
biotechnology and so on – is redefined from time to time and even the plasticity of his 
body.  
Therefore the goal of human life is not only to produce technological tools; this is what 
animals do like the beaver with its dam. Man’s operability is essentially a creative process 
of a second nature expressed in technological forms produced – to paraphrase Goethe – 
‘in a mobile and formative manner according to the example that nature offers us’ 
(Goethe, 1988: 64). 
Imagination - and here we go to the other term that we are most interested in – is 
related to the mental faculties within which man well before the agricultural phase has 
always cultivated this second nature. The invention of agriculture itself, moreover, is one 
of the fruits that man has collected from the technical cultivation of his imagination. It was 
not only the technology of the plough to have given way to agriculture but also having 
been able to understand the temporal chains expressed by the natural cycles and to bring 
them back to a state of semi-estrangement of man’s imagination in that human external 
time that presides the creativity of his actions. In terms of the overall relationship between 
the different phases ranging from sowing to the harvest implies a capacity of observation 
of the changes set out from the present, in which you can capture from time to time one 
of the phases (Marzo 2012: 31-32).  
The interweaving between the potential creative field of the imagination and the creativity 
power of technique is therefore what allows man to cultivate his second nature; to give 
life to the self-produced environment that distinguished him from every other animal and 
what is more joins him analogically to that continuous oscillation produced entirely by the 
intelligence of nature in motion.  
This techno-imaginative human environment does not exist in itself, but it is always 
manifested through socially and historically determined morphological realms where 
second nature is cultivated to produce specific cultural landscapes. In them, the creative 
power of technology is manifested in mutually operative collective action and the 
imagination in the collective consciousness producing the social imaginary. Let us see if we 
can define better the relationship between technique and imagination in the social world 
beginning with the reciprocal action that Simmel defines as follows:   
 
A collection of human beings does not become a society because each of them has an 
objectively determined or subjectively impelling life-content. It becomes a society only 
when the vitality of these contents attains the form of reciprocal influence; only when one 
individual has an effect, immediate or mediate, upon another, is mere spatial aggregation or 
temporal succession trans- formed into society. If, therefore, there is to be a science whose 
subject matter is society and nothing else, it must exclusively investigate these interactions, 
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these kinds and forms of sociation. For everything else found within "society" and realized 
through it and within its framework is not itself society. (Simmel, 1971: 24-25) 
 
Therefore, as stated by Simmel, society originates not from the mere juxtaposition of 
individuals but when they begin to be in favour or against each other, creating forms of 
association with the most different purposes in which social life cultivates its culturalized 
nature. The various social institutions (religious, political, economic, scientific, recreational, 
aesthetic, legal, communicative and so on) are the symbolic systems that regulate the 
organizational devices that regulate the legitimacy of functioning; architectural places 
where the headquarters are, and the tools they use for their practices are all those 
associative forms produced by the continuous movement of everything that has its 
technical epicentre  in mutual action.  
The continual movement of reciprocal action is what the field potential finds in the 
collective mind and it is more than the total of the minds of the affiliates that it is made up 
of. This supra-individual mind is what elevates in the collective consciousness to produce 
social imaginary. It is that image-world in which every social group finds the framework of 
a lasting sense with which to stabilize a relationship with the world and guide the 
interaction in the construction of a certain social reality.  
To resume Uexküll’s relativization in the world of bios, one could say that the human 
environment itself is composed internally of sub-environments set up by the endless 
variations of reactions between reciprocal actions and the social imaginary. These 
historical social environments are mutually in a socio-ecological relationship according to 
certain degrees of reciprocal influence.  It is considerably more porous and labile than 
animal  environments that have a way of being contaminated, hybridize, conflict, coexist 
and even to generate other social imaginaries, which as a whole produce that continuous 
process of metamorphosis that we call history and that in human nature has its historic 
origin.  
 
 
A mythological epi logue  
 
Greek mythology tells the story of Prometheus – one who reflects in advance – and 
Epimetheus – one who ponders afterwards – which allows us to make an epilogue of the 
journey just ended. In the story (Kerényi, 1994: 175-179) the two titan brothers were 
commissioned by the gods to give each animal species a special quality. However clumsy 
Epimetheus, while doing this, forgot man, and had nothing left to give him as a gift. In our 
discussion we dealt with Epimetheus’ forgetfulness by speaking about the non 
specialization of our body. Prometheus, to remedy his brother’s forgetfulness, stole sparks 
form the fire of Hephaestus’ forge – the god of technics – to give as a gift to man whom 
he befriended but at the same time condemned himself. The theft of fire unleashed the 
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wrath of the gods to the point that Zeus commanded Hephaestus to build chains to 
imprison Prometheus on the peak of the Caucasus and call an eagle to rip open his chest. 
In the light of our discussion we could say that in Greek myth the fire that we received 
from Prometheus as a gift is that part of the cosmic fire of Heraclitean physis that can flare 
up and produce different measures of animal environments described by Uexküll. 
According to the Goethean way of analogy, we have identified these measures in the 
relationship between image and technique which gives shape to man’s techno-imaginative 
environment. It is the social use of the Promethean fire that forges the second nature 
within which our species meets its humanity. The fire of Prometheus is usually traced back 
to the technical creativity of metal processing and more generally to the creativity of 
man’s transformative arts. Yet this fire as we have conceived it however is also what 
enlightens the darkness in which man is immersed and produces the visions of the 
imaginary social world. It is these two qualities of fire that burn in human nature that I 
have tried to weave by talking about technique and imagination; a fire that burns in 
human nature and that, by flaring up and dying down, according to the measure of social 
forms, gives life to the continuous oscillation of the historical world.           
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